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When the fi rst patients with ILI in 
households were unvaccinated, ILI 
was observed in 59 of 136 children, 
yielding an SARb0 of 43.4%. Among 
6 exposures caused by vaccinated fi rst 
patients, ILI developed in 1 person, 
yielding an SARb1 of 16.7%. Although 
not signifi cant (p = 0.40), the reduction 
in infectiousness by vaccination was 
estimated to be 1 – SARb1/SARb0 = 
61.6% (95% CI –132.3% to 93.6%). 
The SAR01 was 0% (i.e., 1 exposure 
to an unvaccinated person caused by 
a vaccinated fi rst patient did not result 
in infl uenza). Limiting the defi nition 
of infl uenza to confi rmed cases, all 8 
exposures to vaccinated persons did 
not result in infl uenza, and SAR0b 
and SAR1b were 10.8% and 0%, 
respectively. Similarly, all 5 exposures 
caused by vaccinated fi rst patients 
did not result in confi rmed cases, and 
SARb0 and SARb1 were 10.5% and 0%, 
respectively.
Although the CIs of the estimates 
included zero because of the small 
sample size, the expected reductions 
in susceptibility and infectiousness 
were 75.0% and 61.6%, respectively, 
which is consistent with fi ndings from 
a meta-analysis of vaccine effi cacy 
against seasonal infl uenza (9). Two 
limitations must be noted, namely, 
estimates based on nonrandom 
samples and a case defi nition that 
relied on symptoms of case-patients. 
The former point cannot be explicitly 
addressed by a retrospective study 
design, but we enforced strict 
inclusion criteria for analyses and 
limited our study to healthy children. 
Accounting for the latter point 
(e.g., serologic diagnosis to capture 
symptomatic and asymptomatic cases) 
could yield slightly higher estimates 
than ours, provided that vaccination 
reduces the probability of clinical 
illness if infection occurs. Thus, 
despite these limitations and a critical 
need for further studies that include 
estimations of effectiveness (10), our 
results provide insight into the effects 
of vaccination in reducing risks for 
infection and clinical attack among 
children exposed to pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 virus in their households.
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Pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 Virus in 
3 Wildlife Species, 
San Diego, 
California, USA
To the Editor: The infl uenza A 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus rapidly 
created a global pandemic among 
humans and also appears to have strong 
infectivity for a broad range of animal 
species (1–3). The virus has been 
found repeatedly in swine and has been 
detected in a dog, cats, turkeys, and 
domestic ferrets and in nondomestic 
animals, including skunks, cheetahs, 
and giant anteaters (2–4). In some 
cases, animal-to-animal transmission 
may have occurred, raising concern 
about the development of new wildlife 
reservoirs (2).
In 2009, the fi rst recognized 
occurrence of pandemic (H1N1) 
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2009 in southern California in April 
was followed by a surge of cases 
during October through November 
(4). During this time, respiratory 
illness developed in a 12-year-old 
male American badger (Taxidea taxus 
taxus), a 19-year-old female Bornean 
binturong (Arctictis binturong 
penicillatus), and a 7-year-old black-
footed ferret (Mustela nigripes) 
housed in a San Diego zoological 
garden.
The 3 affected animals had 
clinical signs that included lethargy, 
inappetance, dyspnea, nasal discharge, 
and coughing. The severity of 
disease in the badger and binturong 
necessitated euthanasia; the ferret 
recovered with antibiotic and fl uid 
therapy. Postmortem examination 
revealed bronchopneumonia with 
diffuse alveolar damage in the badger 
and interstitial pneumonia with diffuse 
alveolar damage in the binturong. 
Bacterial cultures and Gram stains of 
affected lung samples were negative.
Molecular analyses for several 
groups of viruses, including 
Herpesviridae, Paramyxoviridae, 
Adenoviridae, and all infl uenza A 
viruses, were performed on frozen 
lung samples from the badger and 
binturong and on frozen conjunctival 
and pharyngeal swabs from the ferret. 
Results of PCRs specifi c for segments 
of infl uenza A nucleoprotein, 
matrix protein, hemagglutinin, and 
neuraminidase genes were positive in 
samples from all 3 animals, and DNA 
sequencing of amplicons identifi ed 
the viruses as pandemic (H1N1) 
2009. Infl uenza A virus was not 
detected in samples from the ferret 
after it recovered. Results of PCRs 
for all other viruses were negative. 
Immunohistochemical evaluation 
of lung samples from the badger 
for antigens of infl uenza A virus (5) 
showed rare staining in bronchiolar 
epithelial cells (Figure).
Respiratory disease in all 3 
affected animals seemed to be caused 
by pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus. The 
badger and binturong were generally 
healthy, no other pathogens were 
detected, and pulmonary lesions were 
consistent with infl uenza pneumonia. 
In these animals, pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 infection was especially 
aggressive, resulting in irreversible 
disease. Reports of pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 virus in skunks and anteaters 
also describe severe disease in those 
species (2,3).
In contrast, the infected black-
footed ferret in our study had relatively 
mild clinical illness, consisting only of 
lethargy. This fi nding was surprising 
given recent experimental studies that 
reported the current pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 virus was more pathogenic in 
domestic ferrets (Mustela putorius 
furo) than typical seasonal infl uenza 
viruses (6). However, several factors 
could have resulted in the low level 
of disease in this animal, such as prior 
immunity to infl uenza viruses or a 
low exposure dose. It is also possible 
black-footed ferrets are innately more 
resistant to infl uenza infection than 
domestic ferrets. 
The origin of infection in these 
cases was not determined but was 
most likely an infected human. All 
animals had some level of contact 
with caretakers or veterinarians and 
were housed separately from other 
wildlife species. None of the potential 
human sources of virus had clinical 
signs before the animals became 
ill; however, infl uenza infections 
in humans can often be mild (7). 
Wild animals, such as opossums and 
skunks, that occasionally enter the 
zoological garden, represent another 
possible source. Good hygiene and 
husbandry practices used within the 
enclosures of the badger, binturong, 
and ferret failed to prevent infection, 
which suggests pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 is effi ciently transmitted to these 
species. Descriptions of infection 
in giant anteaters and cheetahs kept 
under similar conditions also support 
high transmissibility of infl uenza A 
viruses to animals, as do ongoing 
fi ndings for swine (3,4,8).
Although ferrets are known to 
be susceptible to infl uenza A virus, 
to our knowledge, infl uenza in 
badgers and binturongs has not been 
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Figure. Lung section from an American badger showing immunohistochemical staining 
specifi c for the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus within the nucleus and cytoplasm of bronchiolar 
epithelial cells and concurrent infl ammatory cell infi ltrates; hematoxylin counterstain. 
Original magnifi cation ×158. A color version of this fi gure is available online (www.cdc.gov/
EID/content/17/4/747-F.htm).
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reported. Badgers and binturong have 
been housed in zoological gardens 
for decades without incidence of 
infl uenza. Increased surveillance for 
infl uenza by the scientifi c community 
during the pandemic may have resulted 
in the novel recognition of infection 
in these species. Alternatively, the 
current pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus 
may have a broader host range and 
stronger virulence than viruses in the 
past.
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was fi rst 
detected in humans in March 2009 
and reached pandemic levels by June 
of that year, rapidly establishing a rich 
pool for the development of genetic 
variants. Naturally acquired disease 
has now been described in 10 animal 
species, and experimental infection 
has been reported in an additional 
2 animals (mice and cynomolgus 
macaques) (9). The ubiquity of 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and its ability 
to infect a diverse range of hosts is 
worrisome for the health of wildlife 
and for the possibility of creating 
additional reservoirs that could alter 
the evolution of subtype H1N1 viruses 
by applying varied selection pressures 
and establishing new ways of 
generating unique reassortant strains. 
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To the Editor: The biologic role 
of amino acid variants at position 
222 of the hemagglutinin (HA) gene 
of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus in 
severe infections has been extensively 
discussed. A recent series of studies 
(1–3) confi rm the initial suggestions 
that G or N in this position might 
confer greater pathogenic potential 
to the virus than to the wild type. In 
contrast, their data suggest that no 
particular pathogenicity is associated 
with the 222E variant because it 
occurs at the same frequency in 
severe and mild infections. Most 
authors also seem to agree that 
D222G or N appears sporadically in 
phylogenetically distant viruses, with 
limited transmissibility.
However, Puzelli et al. (4) 
reported transmission of a 222G 
mutant from son to father (with the 
appearance of an additional G155E 
mutation). In Italy, the pattern of 
D222 variants has been peculiar, with 
extremely rare appearances of 222G 
and high diffusion of 222E isolates. 
At the National Institute for Infectious 
Diseases in Rome, 82 isolates 
(GenBank accession nos.  CY063455–
CY063469 for new sequences in this 
study) were monitored for D222 
variants. No 222G or N variants were 
detected, even in 24 severe infections, 
nor was the G155E mutation detected. 
This fi nding was not surprising, given 
the worldwide low frequency of this 
mutation, even in severe infections.
Conversely, D222E was detected 
in 12 of the 82 cases, peaking in 
September 2009, when it was present 
in most of the infections, with no 
overrepresentation in severe cases. 
Subsequently, it was substituted by 
different 222D viruses during the 
autumn–winter outbreak. The analysis 
of publicly available sequences from 
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